politique et theorie
5 Février 2026
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February 5, 2026
Foreword by pantopolis
We are publishing this article by Reda (https://www.leftcommunism.org/spip.php?article619), which should reignite a much-needed discussion on class parties and workers' councils in the proletarian revolution.
pantopolis, February 5, 2026
The conclusion seems to us to be The dialectical relationship between the party and the councils is based on the principle of proletarian self-emancipation. Workers' councils, as organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, are the expression of the self-organization of the class, but they cannot guarantee revolutionary victory without a clear communist orientation. The revolutionary party, emanating from the most conscious fraction of the proletariat, must be a tool at the service of the class, actively participating in the councils without ever seeking to replace them. By remaining faithful to this principle, revolutionary communists (pleonasm) can contribute to the construction of a classless, exploitation-free, and stateless society, drawing on the historical lessons of past proletarian struggles.
Workers' councils and the class party
The dialectical relationship between the Communist Party and the proletarian councils:
the role of revolutionary communists in the struggle for proletarian self-emancipation
The question of the revolutionary organization of the proletariat is at the heart of the communist project. Since Marx and Engels, the principle of proletarian self-emancipation—summarized by the formula of the First International: “the emancipation of the working class must be the work of the workers themselves” [1] – has been the foundation of all consistent communist practice. This self-emancipation cannot be achieved without the collective organization of the class, historically embodied by workers' councils or soviets, unitary organs of proletarian self-organization. However, the history of revolutionary struggles shows that these councils, although essential, are not immune to degeneration or influences contrary to the interests of the international proletariat. This is where the role of the revolutionary party, emanating from the most conscious and combative fraction of the proletariat, becomes crucial. This article explores the dialectical relationship between the party and the councils, highlighting the role of revolutionaries in defending the communist project, while rejecting any form of substitutionism or organizational fetishism.
Workers' councils: the expression of proletarian self-organization
Workers' councils, or soviets, embody the self-organization of the working class. Appearing in moments of intense struggle, such as during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 or the workers' uprisings in Germany (1918-1923), they represent a form of unitary organization where workers, regardless of their political or union affiliations, manage their struggles and lay the foundations for a new society. These councils are not simply temporary management bodies, but embryos of proletarian power, capable of challenging the capitalist order as a whole. They are the concrete expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, the organizational form through which the working class exercises its power to destroy the bourgeois state and transform the relations of production.
However, history shows that councils are not immune to abuses. In Germany, for example, the workers' councils of 1918-1919, although initially carrying immense revolutionary potential, were gradually co-opted by social democracy and the trade unions, which slowed down their momentum. This degeneration can also be explained by the absence of a clear communist orientation and the weakness of the revolutionary vanguard
(since it remained diluted for a very long time within bourgeois parties such as the USPD, for example), which was unable to counter reformist or bourgeois influences. This historical observation underscores the need for a revolutionary party capable of consistently defending a truly communist programmatic line within these unitary organs of class self-organization.
The revolutionary party: an important tool in the service of the proletariat
The revolutionary party, as conceived by Marx, Engels, and certain currents of the communist left, is not an entity external or autonomous from the working class. As Onorato Damen rightly stated in his 1952 platform: "Never, under any circumstances, should the proletariat relinquish its role in the struggle. It must not delegate its historical role to others—not even to its own political party " [2]. The Party, which is destined to become international/global, must emerge from proletarian struggles as the crystallization of the most conscious fraction of the proletariat, carrying a clear communist program that allows for consistent revolutionary praxis. It must remain rooted in proletarian self-organization, while fighting against the harmful opportunistic tendencies that, historically, have often threatened the interests of the proletariat, even in revolutionary periods.
Contrary to substitutionist visions, such as those of the Blanquists, the party does not seek to replace the councils or to direct them in a bureaucratic manner. Within the councils, party members must seek to be elected by the rank and file, democratically and revocably, in order to carry out a communist line. This approach differs from that of certain councilist currents, notably the German-Dutch Communist Left, which advocated the immediate dissolution of the party after the proletarian councils had taken power. On the contrary, the party must continue to play a role of ideological clarification and strategic orientation during the revolutionary transition phase (the dictatorship of the proletariat), until the revolution triumphs worldwide and the bourgeoisie is neutralized. The ultimate goal—a society without classes, without private property, without exploitation (and therefore without wage labor), without money, without commodity production, without a rigid and “specialized” social division of labor, without competitive or productivist alienation, without the state—requires the destruction of the capitalist state apparatus, the expropriation of the current ruling class, namely the bourgeoisie, and a total transformation of the social relations of production, a process that can be started but cannot be completed as long as the revolution remains geographically isolated and does not triumph globally (it is very important to insist on this, despite the objections of certain idealists who still prefer to delude themselves with misleading illusions when they talk about the "immediate realization of communism .' We must indeed seek to transform the relations of production as soon as possible in a gradual manner, following a non-market logic centered on the needs of society after the workers have taken power (we could certainly use labor vouchers, doing away with currency, for example, although these would normally no longer be necessary under full communism), but this does not mean that all traces of domestic and foreign trade will automatically disappear.
Marx and Engels already emphasized this necessity in the resolution of the London Conference of the IWA (1871): "Considering that, in the face of this collective power of the propertied classes, the working class can only act as a class by forming a political party, distinct from and opposed to all the old parties formed by the propertied classes " [3]. This formation of a party is essential in order to coordinate the economic and political struggles (which are entirely complementary and inseparable) of the proletariat and provide a coherent revolutionary perspective. Marx and Engels took the same position with regard to the Paris Commune, where they believed that the leadership of the workers' movement should be carried out by its organized vanguard, namely the IWA, thanks to the struggle waged from below and through propaganda (it is not a question of imposing itself from above, but of the most conscious section of the proletariat seeking fully and legitimately to play a guiding role).
Against substitutionism and organizational fetishism
The history of the labor movement is marked by two pitfalls: substitutionism and organizational fetishism. Substitutionism, often associated with Blanquist visions, leads to the autonomization of the party, where it claims to act “on behalf” of the proletariat without relying on its self-organization, or by imposing itself from above without any legitimacy. Maoists and other counterrevolutionary Stalinists/Bonapartists actually go beyond the paroxysm of this Blanquist bureaucratic caricature, since they clearly defend the interests of the bourgeoisie. Here, it is no longer even a question of a party emanating from the vanguard of a class and replacing it by genuinely seeking to emancipate it, but of purely sabotaging any proletarian revolution on a global scale, in addition to ensuring the maintenance of the capitalist status quo.
The fetishism of councils, characteristic of councilism, idealizes the council form as a universal solution, ignoring the fact that councils can be influenced by reformist ideologies based on “market socialism,” decentralized barter for the most enlightened, or simply bourgeois ideas. The proletariat, due to its internal contradictions and geographical or sectoral segmentation (in addition to the powerful and constant pressures emanating from the capitalist and imperialist order, which it would be subject to, even in a revolutionary period), could well reproduce capitalist norms if it is not guided by a clear revolutionary consciousness, as the German experience of 1918-1920 showed. We can therefore say that councilism, by rejecting the role of the party, risks leaving councils more vulnerable to this kind of drift, which clearly implies an increased risk of degeneration. Moreover, the party is not immune to risk either, hence the need not to cut itself off from the grassroots, as the Russian experience reminds us.
The case of the Bolsheviks and the Russian Revolution deserves a more nuanced analysis than one that reduces them to bureaucratic substitutionists. The degeneration of the Soviets after the October Revolution of 1917 cannot be attributed solely to organizational, tactical, or ideological errors made by the Bolshevik Party, even if the Russian Communist Left, such as the Decists (democratic centralists) or Miasnikov, Bukharin/Kommunist, for example, were sometimes right to denounce them. Moreover, it is important to note that the criticisms of the Russian Communist Left were rather nuanced and relevant. For example, they were not generally opposed to the absolute necessity of using bourgeois and military specialists due to the lack of training and resources available (under the control of the proletariat and without this giving them absolute power of leadership, however). and Miasnikov, among others, had advocated a kind of NEP regulated and controlled from below when it became necessary, albeit with fewer concessions. This is a far cry from the criticism sometimes heard that the Bolsheviks should have “immediately abolished the law of value, money, trade,” etc., as if this were possible within the framework of a single country (which was also extremely backward and devastated) and as if it were enough “abolish money” locally to completely emancipate oneself from the capitalist relations of production that condition the allocation of resources on a global scale (unless one prefers a kind of reactionary and vulnerable autarky that is always in competition with the capitalist world and is therefore still determined by it in a certain way, which is hardly desirable in my opinion) ... Especially since, even under war communism, the stated goal was to move toward the disappearance of commodity production. Nevertheless, the failure of the world revolution, Russia's economic backwardness, famines, and the immense peasant anger that was no longer manageable under these conditions led to the NEP and state capitalism, which the Bolsheviks initially saw as temporary in order to modernize production with the hope that a new upsurge of the world revolution would make it possible to truly eliminate capitalist relations of production. In reality, this degeneration of the Russian Revolution can be explained above all by extreme material and social conditions: its isolation, civil war, imperialist encirclement, dependence on external resources and capital, a huge drop in productivity leading to chaotic ruin with famines, disorganization and economic backwardness, as well as the exhaustion of the working class, which gradually allowed a layer of educated (unlike most peasants and workers of the time, who were largely illiterate) and privileged officials (often from the former tsarist administration) to take control. Factories were emptying, factory committees were in disarray, the most politically conscious workers were leaving for the front, and those who remained were struggling to survive, sometimes by selling factory parts, as illustrated in Fyodor Gladkov's novel “The Cement.” In this context, the particularly centralizing measures taken by the Bolsheviks at the outset were aimed at ensuring the survival of proletarian (and peasant, with bureaucratic distortions, as Lenin put it) power in the face of an emergency situation, and not at establishing an ideal model of Soviet democracy in the immediate term, since conditions did not allow for it.
Lenin himself, in texts such as The State and Revolution, clearly envisaged the dictatorship of the proletariat as a “half-state” " [5] that was supposed to wither away as the revolution spread worldwide. He was aware of the limitations of the Soviet state, which he criticized for its growing bureaucratization and its inability to fully overcome various aspects of the old bourgeois state apparatus, as he explicitly denounced in 1922 and 1923:
Far from lacking lucidity on the subject, towards the end of his life he considered that the Soviet state had almost become a tsarist state repainted in red, as he put it, and that the development of a red bourgeoisie had to be prevented by revitalizing it through a series of measures aimed at reviving the soviets and combating their bureaucratization [8], through the most massive proletarianization of the administration possible, as well as through the limitation of salaries (which explains, among other things, the creation of the “partmaksimoum,” which would later be abolished by Stalin, for example), the abolition of privileges, the rotation of offices, revocability, binding mandates (etc.). He even went so far as to consider dissociating the Party-State from the Soviets at the 1921 congress.
Towards the end of the civil war, he also wanted to see the Cheka [9] disappear as a body with repressive decision-making powers, preferring instead to see it play a purely supervisory role with regard to strictly counter-revolutionary political activities, as well as the permanent army [10], where he had aligned himself with Trotsky's position when the latter defended the transition to workers' and peasants' self-defense militias and opposed Frunze, thus showing a return to his 1917 positions.
Indeed, the Bolsheviks knew that the revolution, isolated in Russia, was doomed without a revolutionary upsurge of the proletariat in Europe, as Lenin hoped. In 1918, he typically stated the following:
Unfortunately, the tragedy of the Russian Revolution was that this help never arrived. In these circumstances, the Russian Communist Party, the Third International, and Soviet Russia itself began to adopt increasingly emergency and stopgap policies (such as the NEP, which Lenin saw as a necessary and temporary setback/concession in order to further modernize production in particularly backward Russia, until a new and much-desired revolutionary upsurge of the world proletariat could occur) . The same was true of iron discipline, Taylorism, and in particular the absorption of factory committees by trade unions, even though their role in worker control had been strongly defended (notably by the Bolsheviks) in the first months after the revolution. The interesting analyses of S. A. Smith in his book Red Petrograd illustrate this, among other things:
Consequently, to deny, as some do (often those who wrongly reject October 1917 as a mere “bourgeois revolution”), that all this was primarily caused by the enormous emergency situation resulting from economic backwardness, the chaotic ruin/famine caused by the civil war, and the threat of imperialist invasions, by the fact that the proletariat was gradually disappearing more and more, even to a large extent, dying on the front lines and/or deserting (and it must be kept in mind that this change in social composition had devastating consequences even after the civil war) when it was already an ultra-minority, would make absolutely no sense. On the other hand, it is important to understand that making this observation does not imply that the Russian communist left was not sometimes right in its criticisms of Lenin (although here too, it is necessary to qualify this, as it will depend on the subject), but it does allow us to recontextualize and better understand what caused the implementation (imposition) of these measures.
The gradual bureaucratization and the final outcome of this process, which would allow the counter-revolution to triumph since many of the most valiant revolutionary proletarians would no longer be there to prevent it, would subsequently lead to Stalinism. In short, these phenomena did not result from simple ill will, but rather from the exhaustion of the Russian proletariat and the failure of the revolution in the West in particular. Despite these limitations, the Russian Revolution remains a historic achievement, embodying in a way the second titanic milestone in the struggle for human emancipation after the one already engraved by the Paris Commune, and one from which we can learn a great deal. As Rosa Luxemburg explained so well:
Moreover, a significant part of the Italian communist left, in line with thinkers such as Damen, who himself follows in the footsteps of Marx and Engels, proposes a dialectical synthesis: the party must be a tool at the service of the class, active within the councils, without seeking to transform them into empty shells or mere rubber-stamp chambers. Its members must uphold a clear communist line, participate in debates and decisions in councils/general assemblies/struggle committees to ensure a guiding role and that their leadership tends towards a trajectory of overcoming capitalist social relations, rather than a dead end. All this was rightly and fundamentally reiterated at the 8th Congress of the Bolshevik Party in March 1919:
The role of revolutionary communists: vigilance and programmatic clarification
As Marx pointed out in one of his letters to Jules Guesde:
Revolutionary communists must therefore intervene in class-based organizations to defend an internationalist and communist perspective.
This means fighting against reformist or nationalist tendencies, such as those that prevailed in Germany in 1918-1919, and promoting a global vision of revolution aimed at the abolition of capitalism. As Marx noted (at a meeting of the Central Authority in 1850):
Of course, this is true if the proletariat is not guided by a clear and coherent communist perspective through its most conscious fraction (which, as Marx shows, must be organized into a party with collective responsibility and a certain discipline in order to display the communist project as clearly as possible within social movements, all while being properly coordinated) via collective struggles.
Revolutionaries must therefore act as a conscious vanguard, participating in the self-organization of the class and seeking to be democratically elected to interconnected proletarian councils (with a central plan and on a regional scale involving the joint planning of production by the workers themselves to avoid the atomization/federalist or localist fragmentation of production, which would in no way correspond to a communist perspective but rather to a petty-bourgeois one) in order to collectively apply a communist line,
while remaining under mandatory mandates that can be revoked if necessary by the rank and file (with a distribution/rotation of responsibilities/tasks when useful), as well as with regard to elected non-party delegates, etc.
In short, we must seek to overcome the dichotomy between centralism and federalism. Nevertheless, I would add that while revolutionary and independent parties must be tolerated, this is not the case for counter-revolutionary organizations and those that openly betray the proletarian movement (by breaking with internationalism in the midst of inter-imperialist war, for example), and that we must fight against bourgeois democratic fetishism, according to which if the workers elect counter-revolutionary delegates, then this must be accepted and no attempt should be made to bring down the soviets in question, regardless of their content and programmatic line. We must therefore denounce the democratic formalism that transforms the soviets into a kind of parody that could be called “formless workers' parliaments” (as Trotsky did [17], which is ironic when we know what he would later advocate), and recognize the need to create grassroots clubs to increase pressure on local soviets. It can be said that Trotsky, who remains nonetheless an important figure in the history of the proletarian movement, sided with the counter-revolution on both these points (going beyond the stage of opportunism) because of his support for bourgeois anti-fascism in Spain in 1936/1939, like the anarchists of the CNT [18], and his unfortunate "unconditional support for the degenerate workers' state that is the USSR " [19] during the inter-imperialist Second World War, sided with the counter-revolution on these two issues (going beyond the stage of opportunism). Moreover, he also made a regrettable mistake that should be criticized in thinking that defending, even temporarily, a so-called “workers' government” composed of, among others, the PCF and the SFIO [20] could be in any way relevant to the proletariat on the pretext that these were “popular” parties “ (in line with the bourgeois democratic reforms he had previously defended for the United Kingdom and the United States, this can also be explained by his conception of permanent revolution, which can sometimes be confusing) ... This opportunistic maneuver itself stems from the tactic advocated by the degenerating Third International called the ”united front" [21], which the Trotskyists continued to defend, as did Trotsky and the Fourth International's transitional program [22] thereafter, even though most of them effectively opposed the “popular front,” the nationalist and stageist conceptions of the counterrevolutionary Stalinists, and their anti-Marxist and anti-communist theory of "socialism in one country ."
Historical lessons and current perspectives
Historical experiences, such as the Russian Revolution and the German workers' councils, show the complexity of the relationship between party and councils. In Russia, the soviets of played a central role in the seizure of power, but their weakening can be explained by dramatic material conditions: civil war, isolation, and the exhaustion of the proletariat.
The Bolsheviks, initially, far from being mere bureaucratic substitutionists who supposedly carried out a coup d'état in October 1917 as some claim (whether it be hegemonic bourgeois propaganda, the Mensheviks, the anarchists, the Communisators, or the Councilists), initially acted legitimately with the support of the working masses in an emergency context to preserve workers' power in the context of a dual revolution, while recognizing their own limitations, as evidenced by Lenin's criticisms of the bureaucratization of the Soviet state. A typical example is his letter to Miasnikov in 1921 on the subject, which is very interesting: “Revitalizing the Soviets, ensuring the cooperation of non-party members, allowing them to check the work of Party members: this is absolutely true. This work has barely begun” [23]. This was especially true given that he was already taking this line in 1918: “Socialism cannot be implemented by a minority, by the Party. It can only be implemented by tens of millions of people, once they have learned to do it themselves” [24]. Despite the fact that he would also be mistaken in approving a measure in 1921 (a particular year in terms of the retreat of the revolution, including internationally, with the foreign policy of the Comintern alternating increasingly between defending the world revolution and opportunistic compromises with certain national bourgeoisies of "states oppressed by Western imperialism " to defend the specific interests of the Soviet state in terms of economic and political stabilization ...) banning party factions, which, even if it was supposed to be temporary in a context of crisis, had the effect of further marginalizing the Russian communist left, to the benefit of the internal gravediggers of the revolution. This did not leave him unscathed either, just as Trotsky himself would later evolve on the dissociation of the councils and the party, the question of the trade union and the militarization of labor, on China and the autonomy of the proletariat against the Kuomintang, and the need to do away with the model of single-person management with factory directors who had no real control over factory committees in the development of production plans (and how to implement them) via local and central soviets, a development that can also be seen in relation to Taylorism, etc. [25].
It is nevertheless worth briefly mentioning the case of the repression of striking workers during the civil war in Russia, which was denounced by the Russian communist left because everything should have been done to negotiate with them, even if their demands were often unachievable in the extremely tense conditions of famine and civil war. Sometimes during certain strikes, there were also counter-revolutionary Menshevik or SR (even left-wing) elements who joined in to literally seek to overthrow the Soviet state outright without compromise, which did not help matters [26]. The same was true of the coups carried out by the Bolsheviks in Soviets that had fallen into the hands of Mensheviks or SRs, given that the latter actively sought to overthrow the Soviet state. For the left-wing SRs in particular, who initially ruled the Sovnarkom outright with the Bolsheviks, the decisive turning point came with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which Lenin considered necessary for temporary survival. There was also repression of anarchists, as was the case with the Black Guards in 1918, who called for people to arm themselves against the Bolsheviks and the Soviet state via their press [27], as well as abuses by the Cheka in this regard. Not to mention the counter-revolutionary peasant revolts, such as the one in Tambov, for example. there was also the insurrection of the Kronstadt sailors, who were defending certain clearly legitimate demands (some of which were directly inspired by the Soviet constitution of 1918), while others, such as granting total freedom in such a dangerous context to “socialist revolutionaries” who were in fact seeking to destroy the revolution, are much less so. In addition to their political confusion regarding the question of the peasant petty bourgeoisie (including their links with the SRs, for example), trade, and the repeatedly expressed desire for “soviets without communists,” which was different from their legitimate demand for the autonomy of the soviets from the party. It should be remembered, however, that despite the fact that the Bolsheviks seemed to have legitimate reasons for repressing Kronstadt, according to historian Paul Avrich [28] (in addition to the fairly serious cases of anti-Semitism/racism historically documented concerning several influential sailors among them, this is mainly related to the international context, for example Poland, nearby, with the imminent risk of imperialist invasion and the perfect opportunity for counter-revolutionaries to take control of the fortress), this in no way negates the enormous responsibility of the Bolsheviks in their refusal to negotiate to avoid this tragedy, which also affected the sailors of Kronstadt who had initially participated in the October Revolution of 1917 and many of whom were part of the proletarian camp, as Miasnikov and some Bolsheviks present at the scene rightly pointed out (nevertheless, a large number of them also came from the peasantry, particularly in 1921, but this still does not justify this serious error, which contributed to further intensifying the substitution of the party over the soviets [29]). On the other hand, it seems to me that the position taken on this subject within the Italian communist left by Bilan, Vercesi, and Damen's Battaglia Comunista tendency, which denounces the abuses of the Red Terror, is relevant. For even if revolutionary class violence is indispensable (as Rosa Luxemburg clearly ended up admitting during the Spartacist uprising), it cannot always be carried out in the same way, regardless of the group of individuals it targets and the context [30]. We could also mention the conflict between Makhnovist Ukraine, which did not defend the same class interests as the Bolsheviks [31] and which pursued a small-bourgeois, pro-barter, regionalist peasant policy that was highly questionable on many points, in addition to anti-worker looting of Soviet granaries, even seeking to ally itself with other green armies, the pogromist Petliura, as well as Grigoriev and his troops, who were also responsible for pogroms [32]. This does not detract from the fact that the Bolsheviks also made mistakes in this regard. In short, the failure of the world revolution sealed the degeneration of the Soviet experiment, which had a devastating impact on the world proletariat, but this experiment (through its beneficial contributions, but also through its mistakes that must not be repeated) remains an essential historical lesson for today's communists.
In Germany, the absence of a strong revolutionary party rooted in the councils (in addition to the enormous influence of the bourgeoisie and the reformist unions) allowed social democracy to divert the revolutionary potential. These experiences underscore the importance of a vanguard communist party with a clear communist program, capable of campaigning within the councils without replacing them, as was unfortunately the case with the Sovnarkom in Russia, initially conceived as a temporary measure and still subject to the approval of the councils, but which led to excessive autonomy from the Soviet base, particularly from the spring of 1918 onwards, due to various factors mentioned above, despite the defense of the world proletarian revolution.
In the current context of the crisis of capitalism, revolutionary communists must draw on the lessons of the past to build a proletarian party capable of campaigning within self-organized bodies in order to defend an internationalist communist perspective.
Furthermore, the line taken by the comrades of the ICT in their leaflet (for the mobilizations of September 10 and 18) on this subject seems to me to be extremely relevant: "To defend ourselves, we cannot rely on the unions and institutional parties, which have sufficiently demonstrated over the years that they are the docile allies of capital.
Conclusion
The dialectical relationship between the party and the councils is based on the principle of proletarian self-emancipation. Workers' councils, as organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, are the expression of the self-organization of the class, but they cannot guarantee revolutionary victory without a clear communist orientation. The revolutionary party, emanating from the most conscious fraction of the proletariat, must be a tool at the service of the class, actively participating in the councils without ever seeking to replace them. By remaining faithful to this principle, revolutionary communists (pleonasm) can contribute to the construction of a classless, exploitation-free, and stateless society, drawing on the historical lessons of past proletarian struggles.
Réda
[3] Resolutions of the London Conference, September 17-23, 1871.
[4] Second Draft of The Civil War in France, K. Marx
[5] The State and Revolution, Lenin.
[6] Speech In Opening the Congress, March 27-April 2, 1922.
[7] How to reorganize the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection?
[8] Better less, but better, Lenin, March 2, 1923.
[9] In the resolution of the 11th All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b), held from December 19 to 22, 1921, the issue of limiting powers was raised, which served as the basis for Lenin's subsequent speech on limiting his prerogatives:
“The competence and scope of activity of the Cheka must be reduced accordingly, and the Cheka itself must be reorganized.” He declared that the institution should be restricted to the purely political sphere (the control of so-called counterrevolutionary activities) and no longer be repressive, removing all decision-making power from it at this level.
[10] How the Revolution Armed Itself, Trotsky.
[11] Speech at the Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
[12] RED PETROGRAD.
[14] Class Consciousness and Revolutionary Organization.
[15] Letter from Karl Marx to Jules Guesde recently found.
[16] Meeting of the Central Council of the League, 17-9-1850
[17] Terrorism and Communism, Trotsky.
[18] Trotsky's position on the civil war in Spain.
[19] Wikirouge: Defense of the USSR by Trotsky.
[20] Discussion on the history of the Left Opposition.
[21] The Comintern and the united front.
[22] Critique of Trotsky's Transitional Program.
[23] A Letter To G. Myasnikov, Lenin.
[24] Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the RCP(B.), Lenin.
[25] The USSR and the Tasks of the Transition Period, Trotsky.
[26] Crimes and Mass Violence in the Russian Civil Wars (1918-1921).
[27] Lev Chorny.
[28] Kronstadt 1921 – Paul Avrich.
[29] 1921: Kronstadt, the beginning of the counter-revolution?
[30] The Question of the State, October No. 2 - March 1938.
[31] The Makhno Movement and Bolshevism.
[32] Kontrrazvedka, The story of the Makhnovist intelligence service, Vyacheslav Azarov.
[33] No sacrifices to bail out the state coffers! Let's fight to defend ourselves, not to save the national economy!
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